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Introduction
In this paper we study the formation of groups or classes from a social choice perspective. Adapting the framework of Fishburn and Rubinstein (1986) , we This paper was partly written while the …rst author was visiting the Delhi Center of the Indian Statistical Institute. The hospitality of the Institute and the helpful comments and suggestions of Anirban Kar, Debasis Mishra, and Arunava Sen are gratefully acknowledged.
y Chair of Economic Theory, Saarland University, Germany; e-mail: dinko.dimitrov@mx.uni-saarland.de z Chair of Economic Theory, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany; e-mail: clemens.puppe@kit.edu 1 consider an environment in which every individual has a view about how the society should be partitioned into classes. A group identity function assigns then to each pro…le of views a societal decomposition into classes. In the aggregation problem considered here the number of classes is endogenously determined. This is in contrast to environments in which the number of social groups is assumed to be …xed and their names matter (cf. Çengelci The central axiom in most of these characterizations is a binary independence condition requiring the decision of whether or not two individuals belong to the same social class to depend only on the individual classi…cations with respect to these two individuals.
By contrast, we concentrate in this paper on non-bossy social aggregation which requires the group identity function to depend only on one cell from the individual partition of each society member -namely on the cell the corresponding individual classi…es himself in. Intuitively, non-bossiness thus states that the decision of whether or not two individuals belong to the same class should not depend on the view of unconcerned individuals. Put in a di¤erent way, non-bossiness makes the social aggregation dependent on the information provided only by a corresponding opinion graph on the set of individuals. A directed edge (i; j) in this graph corresponds to the situation in which individual i classi…es himself in the same group with individual j. The group identity functions we introduce in this paper correspond to 2 particular ways of decomposing this graph. Speci…cally, any group identity function satisfying a positive liberalism condition and a simple sovereignty requirement decomposes the graph into particular re…nements of its weakly connected components. Having described the set of admissible partitions from which such a group identity function selects the societal classi…cation, we then introduce natural equal treatment requirements as to narrow the admisible set and to characterize the non-bossy rule generating the coarsest admissible partition.
Basic de…nitions and notation
The society is denoted by N = f1; : : : ; ng, and is the set of all partitions of N . Recall that a partition of N is a collection of non-empty, pairwise disjoint subsets of N whose union is N . We call these subsets groups or classes. A partition is said to re…ne another partition 0 , denoted by 0 , if every group from is contained in some group from 0 ; we also say in this case that 0 is coarser than . The re…nement relation is a partial ordering on . Further, for some j 2 N n f1; 2g, let j be such that f1g ; f2g 2 j . Then, the conjunctive aggregator classi…es 1 and 2 together if the pro…le is , while 1 and 2 are classi…ed as being single if the pro…le is j ; j ; thus, NB is violated.
As is easily veri…ed by repeated application of NB, the non-bossiness condition restricts a group identity function to depend only on the individual views with respect to the groups the corresponding individuals themselves belong to:
Fact A group identity function f satis…es NB if and only if
This fact allows us to look at an underlying "opinion graph"when searching for non-bossy social aggregators. Recall that a directed graph H = (V; E)
consists of a set of vertices V and a set of directed edges E V V . Let X V . We say that X is weakly connected if, for every i; j 2 X, there is a sequence of vertices k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; k m 2 X for some positive integer m such
the set X of vertices is called strongly connected. We call X a weakly (strongly) connected component if it is weakly (strongly) connected and, for all Y N which properly contain X, Y is not weakly (strongly) connected.
The weak (strong) decomposition of H is its (unique) decomposition into weakly (strongly) connected components. Clearly, the strong decomposition of H is a re…nement of its weak decomposition.
To describe the decompositions we study in the next section, we construct an opinion graph H = (V ; E ) for each 2 D, where V = N and E = f(i; j) : i 6 = j; j 2 i i g. Notice again that the Fact mentioned above allows us to restrict ourselves to the information provided by H . More precisely, the group identity functions presented in this paper assign to each pro…le of individual views particular re…nements of the weakly connected components in H . de…nitions, H has two weakly connected components -f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g and f8g, and three strongly connected components -f1; 2; 3g, f4; 5; 6; 7g, and f8g.
3 Weakly connected components and their re…nements
We consider two simple axioms and describe …rst the set of admissible partitions from which any group identity function that satis…es the two axioms selects the societal classi…cation. We then introduce natural equal treatment requirements as to narrow the admissible set and to characterize the non-bossy rule generating the coarsest admissible partition.
The …rst axiom has a liberal ‡avor and states that the aggregator puts two individuals in the same social group provided that both individuals think that they belong together (cf. Houy 2007).
Positive Liberalism (PL): A group identity function f satis…es Positive
Liberalism if for every pro…le 2 D and all i; j 2 N , i 2 j j and j 2
In order to explain our next axiom, Negative Group Sovereignty, imagine a situation in which the society N is partitioned into two non-empty subsets 
Thus, each social class in every partition in R ( ) belongs to a re…nement of fDg and to a coarsening of D for some weakly connected component
Let us have a look again at Fig. 1 and describe the way the corresponding axioms restrict the decomposition of the depicted society. First, by NGS, the eighth individual cannot be grouped in the same class with any other individual. Second, by PL, the following individuals have to be classi…ed together: 1, 2, and 3; and 4 and 5. Hence, the coarsest partition compatible with these restrictions is ff1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7g ; f8gg, while the …nest one is ff1; 2; 3g ; f4; 5g ; f6g ; f7g ; f8gg. Note that the societal classi…cation into strongly connected components ff1; 2; 3g ; f4; 5; 6; 7g ; f8gg is compatible with NGS and PL as well, and it is a member of the set R ( ) for the problem considered in Fig. 1 . for all i 2 N 1 and all j 2 N 2 such that f (
and k 2 2 N 2 . Notice that we have in such a case a direct contradiction to
Consider now a group identity function f which satis…es PL and NGS, and take 2 D. In what follows we show that f ( ) = 2 R ( ) leads to a contradiction. 
(2) We show next that it is impossible for f ( ) to contain a social class which is a strict subset of some class from the …nest partition ( ) contained in R ( 
We conclude that f ( ) 2 R ( ).
In order to show the independence of the axioms, consider the following two rules. Each rule satis…es one of the axioms but not the other. Moreover, for each of these rules, there is a pro…le 2 N s.t. f ( ) = 2 R ( ).
(not PL) Take the aggregator f 0 de…ned as follows: for all 2 D, f 0 ( ) = N . This aggregator clearly violates PL while satisfying NGS. We have for this rule that f 0 (fN g ; : : : ; fN g) = 2 R (fN g ; : : : ; fN g) = ffN gg.
(not NGS) Consider the aggregator f 00 de…ned as follows: for all 2 D, f 00 ( ) = fN g. This rule satis…es PL but not NGS, and we have that This completes the proof. 
Proposition 3 A group identity function f satis…es PL, NGS, and SET if and only if for all 2 D we have either f ( ) = ( ) or f ( ) = ( ).
Moreover, the three axioms are independent and together imply non-bossiness. As is easily veri…ed, PGS and NL jointly imply that the societal classi…cation generated at any pro…le of individual views is a coarsest partition into cliques.
Notice that, analogously to the case of PL and NGS, conditions NL and PGS alone do not imply the non-bossiness condition NB either. To verify this, consider a situation where there are di¤erent coarsest partitions into cliques, for instance in the situation of Fig. 1 above these are the partitions = ff1; 2g; f3g; f4; 5g; f6g; f7g ; f8gg and 0 = ff1g; f2; 3g; f4; 5g; f6g; f7g ; f8gg.
De…ne a group identity function f as follows: f selects if the individual views w.r.t. their own classi…cation are as shown in Fig. 1 and individual 6 thinks that individuals 1 and 2 belong together, f selects 0 if the individual views w.r.t. their own classi…cation are as shown in Fig. 1 and individual 6 does not think that individuals 1 and 2 belong together, and f selects some coarsest partition into cliques in any other case. Clearly, f then satis…es NL and PGS but violates non-bossiness. The same example shows that NL, PGS, and SET do not imply NB either.
Finally, it turns out that no group identity function can jointly satisfy NL, PGS, and ET + . Let N = f1; 2; 3g and 1 = ff1; 2g ; f3gg, 2 = ff1; 2; 3gg, 3 = ff1g ; f2; 3gg. For any group identity function f satisfying NL and PGS one has f ( ) 2 fff1; 2g ; f3gg ; ff1g ; f2; 3ggg. If f ( ) = ff1; 2g ; f3gg, 
